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Prologue
1. John W. Garver, “China's Decision for War with India in 1962,” in Alastair Iaian Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds.,New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 116, citing Sun Shao and Chen Zibin,Ximalaya shan de xue: Zhong Yin zhanzheng shilu[Snows of the Himalaya Mountains: The True Record of the China-India War] (Taiyuan: Bei Yue Wenyi Chubanshe, 1991), 95; Wang Hongwei,Ximalaya shan qingjie: Zhong Yin guanxi yanjiu[The Himalayas Sentiment: A Study of China-India Relations] (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue Chubanshe, 1998), 228–30.
2.HuaxiaandZhonghua, other common appellations for China, have no precise English meaning, but carry similar connotations of a great and central civilization.
Chapter1: The Singularity of China
1. “Ssuma Ch'ien's Historical Records-Introductory Chapter,” trans. Herbert J. Allen,The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1894), 278–80 (“Chapter I: Original Records of the Five Gods”).
2. Abbé Régis-Evariste Huc,The Chinese Empire(London: Longman, Brown, Green & Longmans, 1855), as excerpted in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, eds.,Imperial China: The Decline of the Last Dynasty and the Origins of Modern China, The 18th and 19th Centuries(New York: Vintage, 1967), 31.
3. Luo Guanzhong,The Romance of the Three Kingdoms, trans. Moss Roberts (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1995), 1.
4. Mao used this example to demonstrate why China would survive even a nuclear war. Ross Terrill,Mao: A Biography(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 268.
5. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History, 2nd enlarged ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 93.
6. F. W. Mote,Imperial China: 900–1800(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 614–15.
7. Ibid., 615.
8. Thomas Meadows,Desultory Notes on the Government and People of China(London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1847), as excerpted in Schurmann and Schell, eds.,Imperial China, 150.
9. Lucian Pye, “Social Science Theories in Search of Chinese Realities,”China Quarterly132 (1992): 1162.
10. Anticipating that his colleagues in Washington would object to this proclamation of Chinese universal jurisdiction, the American envoy in Beijing obtained an alternate translation and textual exegesis from a local British expert. The latter explained that the offending expression—literally “to soothe and bridle the world”—was a standard formulation, and that the letter to Lincoln was in fact a (by the Chinese court's standards) particularly modest document whose phrasing indicated genuine goodwill.Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the First Session of the Thirty-eighth Congress, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1864), Document No. 33 (“Mr.Burlingame to Mr. Seward, Peking, January 29, 1863”), 846–48.
11. For a brilliant account of these achievements by a Western scholar deeply (and perhaps excessively) enchanted by China, see Joseph Needham's encyclopedic multivolumeScience and Civilisation in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954).
12. Fairbank and Goldman, China, 89.
13. Angus Maddison,The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2006), Appendix B, 261–63. It must be allowed that until the Industrial Revolution, total GDP was tied more closely to population size; thus China and India outstripped the West in part by virtue of their larger populations. I would like to thank Michael Cembalest for bringing these figures to my attention.
14. Jean-Baptiste Du Halde,Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l'empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise(La Haye: H. Scheurleer, 1736), as translated and excerpted in Schurmann and Schell, eds., Imperial China, 71.
15. François Quesnay,Le despotisme de la Chine, as translated and excerpted in Schurmann and Schell, eds.,ImperialChina, 115.
16. For an exploration of Confucius's political career synthesizing classical Chinese accounts, see Annping Chin,The Authentic Confucius: A Life of Thought and Politics(New York: Scribner, 2007).
17. See Benjamin I. Schwartz,The World of Thought in Ancient China(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1985), 63–66.
18. Confucius,The Analects, trans. William Edward Soothill (New York: Dover, 1995), 107.
19. See Mark Mancall, “The Ch'ing Tribute System: An Interpretive Essay,” in John King Fairbank, ed.,The Chinese World Order(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 63–65; Mark Mancall,China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1984), 22.
20. Ross Terrill,The New Chinese Empire(New York: Basic Books, 2003), 46.
21. Fairbank and Goldman, China, 28, 68–69.
22. Masataka Banno,China and the West, 1858–1861: The Origins of the Tsungli Yamen(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 224–25; Mancall,China at the Center, 16–17.
23. Banno,China and the West,224–28; Jonathan Spence,The Search for Modern China(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 197.
24. Owen Lattimore, “China and the Barbarians,” in Joseph Barnes, ed.,Empire in the East(New York: Doubleday, 1934), 22.
25. Lien-sheng Yang, “Historical Notes on the Chinese World Order,” in Fairbank, ed.,The Chinese World Order, 33.
26. As excerpted in G. V. Melikhov, “Ming Policy Toward the Nüzhen (1402– 1413),” in S. L. Tikhvinsky, ed., China and Her Neighbors: From Ancient Times to the Middle Ages (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981), 209.
27. Ying-shih Yü, Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 37.
28. Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858–1880 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 9.
29. Thus the extension of Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia (both “Inner” and, at various points of Chinese history, “Outer”) and Manchuria, the respective founts of the foreign conquerors that founded the Yuan and Qing Dynasties.
30. For enlightening discussions of these themes, and a fuller explanation of the rules ofwei qi, see David Lai, “Learning from the Stones: A Go Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept, Shi” (Carlisle, Pa.: United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2004); and David Lai and Gary W. Hamby, “East Meets West: An Ancient Game Sheds New Light on U.S.-Asian Strategic Relations,”Korean Journal of Defense Analysis14, no. 1 (Spring 2002).
31. A convincing case has been made thatThe Art of War is the work of a later(though still ancient) author during the Warring States period, and that he sought to imbue his ideas with greater legitimacy by backdating them to the era of Confucius. These arguments are summarized in Sun Tzu,The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), Introduction, 1–12; and Andrew Meyer and Andrew Wilson, “Sunzi Bingfaas History and Theory,” in Bradford A. Lee and Karl F. Walling, eds.,Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael Handel(London: Frank Cass, 2003).
32. Sun Tzu,The Art of War, trans. John Minford (New York: Viking, 2002), 3.
33. Ibid., 87–88.
34. Ibid., 14–16.
35. Ibid., 23.
36. Ibid., 6.
37. In Mandarin Chinese, “shi” is pronounced roughly the same as “sir” with a “sh.” The Chinese character combines the elements of “cultivate” and “strength.”
38. Kidder Smith, “The Military Texts: TheSunzi,” in Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, eds.,Sources of Chinese Tradition, vol. 1,From Earliest Times to 1600, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 215. The Chinese author Lin Yutang explainedshias an aesthetic and philosophic notion of what a situation “is going to become . . . the way the wind, rain, flood or battle looks for the future, whether increasing or decreasing in force, stopping soon or continuing indefinitely, gaining or losing, in what direction [and] with what force.” Lin Yutang,The Importance of Living (New York: Harper, 1937), 442.
39. See Joseph Needham and Robin D. S. Yates,Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 5, part 6: “Military Technology: Missiles and Sieges” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 33–35, 67–79.
40. See Lai and Hamby, “East Meets West,” 275.
41. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,The Philosophy of History, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances Simon, as "ed in Spence,The Search for Modern China, 135–36.
Chapter 2: The Kowtow Question and the Opium War
1. The story of Qing expansion in “inner Asia” under a series of exceptionally able Emperors is related in rich detail in Peter Perdue, China Marches West:The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005).
2. See J. L. Cranmer-Byng, ed.,An Embassy to China: Being the journal kept by Lord Macartney during his embassy to the Emperor Ch'ien-lung, 1793–1794(London: Longmans, Green, 1962), Introduction, 7–9 (citing theCollected Statutesof the Qing dynasty).
3. “Lord Macartney's Commission from Henry Dundas” (September 8, 1792), in Pei-kai Cheng, Michael Lestz, and Jonathan Spence, eds.,The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 93–96.
4. Ibid., 95.
5. Macartney's Journal, in AnEmbassy to China, 87–88.
6. Ibid., 84–85.
7. Alain Peyrefitte,The Immobile Empire(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 508.
8. Macartney's Journal, in AnEmbassy to China, 105.
9. Ibid., 90.
10. Ibid., 123.
11. Ibid.
12. See Chapter 1, “The Singularity of China”.
13. Macartney's Journal, inAn Embassy to China, 137.
14. Qianlong's First Edict to King George III (September 1793), in Cheng, Lestz, and Spence, eds.,The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection, 104–6.
15. Qianlong's Second Edict to King George III (September 1793), in Cheng, Lestz, and Spence, eds.,The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection, 109.
16. Macartney's Journal, in An Embassy to China, 170.
17.Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2006), Appendix B, 261, Table B–18 , “World GDP , 20 Countries and Regional Totals, 0–1998 A.D.”
18. See Jonathan Spence,The Search for Modern China(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 149–50; Peyrefitte,The Immobile Empire, 509–11; Dennis Bloodworth and Ching Ping Bloodworth,The Chinese Machiavelli: 3000 Years of Chinese Statecraft(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1976), 280.
19. Peter Ward Fay,The Opium War, 1840–1842(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 68.
20. Peyrefitte,The Immobile Empire, xxii.
21. “Lin Tse-hsü's Moral Advice to Queen Victoria, 1839,” in Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, eds.,China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 26.
22. Ibid., 26–27.
23. Ibid., 25–26.
24. “Lord Palmerston to the Minister of the Emperor of China” (London, February 20, 1840), as reprinted in Hosea Ballou Morse,The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 1, The Period of Conflict, 1834–186, part 2 (London: Longmans, Green, 1910), 621–24.
25. Ibid., 625.
26. Memorial to the Emperor, as translated and excerpted in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, eds.,Imperial China: The Decline of the Last Dynasty and the Origins of Modern China, the 18th and 19th Centuries (New York: Vintage, 1967), 146–47.
27. E. Backhouse and J. O. P. Bland,Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1914), 396.
28. Tsiang Ting-fu,Chung-kuo chin tai shih[China's Modern History] (Hong Kong: Li-ta Publishers, 1955), as translated and excerpted in Schurmann and Schell, eds., Imperial China, 139.
29. Ibid., 139–40.
30. Maurice Collis,Foreign Mud: Being an Account of the Opium Imbroglio at Canton in the 1830s and the Anglo-Chinese War That Followed(New York: New Directions, 1946), 297.
31. See Teng and Fairbank, eds.,China's Response to the West, 27–29.
32. Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 187–88.
33. Spence,The Search for Modern China, 158.
34. John King Fairbank,Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842–1854(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 109–12.
35. “Ch'i-ying's Method for Handling the Barbarians, 1844,” as translated in Teng and Fairbank, eds.,China's Response to the West, 38–39.
36. Ibid., 38. See also Hsü,The Rise of Modern China, 208–9. A copy of this memorial was discovered years later in the British capture of an official residence in Guangzhou. Disgraced by its revelation during an 1858 negotiation with British representatives, Qiying fled. For fleeing an official negotiation witho authorization, Qiying was sentenced to death. Deference to his elite stature was made, and he was “permitted” to perform the deed himself with a silken bowstring.
37. Meadows,Desultory Notes on the Government and People of China, in Schurmann and Schell, eds., Imperial China, 148–49.
38. See Morse,The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, vol. 1, part 2, 632–36.
39. See ibid., part 1, 309–10; Qianlong's Second Edict to King George III, in Cheng, Lestz, and Spence,The Search for Modern China: A Documentary Collection, 109.
Chapter 3: From Preeminence to Decline
1. “Wei Yuan's Statement of a Policy for Maritime Defense, 1842,” in Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, eds.,China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 30.
2. Ibid., 31–34.
3. Ibid., 34.
4.Opinion differs as to whether the inclusion of Most Favored Nation clauses in these initial treaties represented a concerted Chinese strategy or a tactical oversight. One scholar notes that in some respects it curtailed the Qing court's scope of maneuver in subsequent negotiations with the foreign powers, since any Western power could be sure it would gain the benefits afforded to its rivals. On the other hand, the practical effect was to prevent any one colonizer from attaining a dominant economic position—a contrast to the experience of many neighboring countries during this period. See Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, The Rise of Modern China, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 190–92.
5. “Wei Yuan's Statement of a Policy for Maritime Defense,” in Teng and Fairbank, eds.,China's Response to the West, 34.
6. Prince Gong (Yixin), “The New Foreign Policy of January 1861,” in Teng and Fairbank, eds.,China's Response to the West, 48.
7. Macartney's Journal, in J. L. Cranmer- Byng, ed., AnEmbassy to China: Being the journal kept by Lord Macartney during his embassy to the Emperor Ch'ien-lung, 1793–1794 (London: Longmans, Green, 1962), 191, 239.
8. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman,China: A New History, 2nd enlarged ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 216. For an account of the Taiping Rebellion and the career of its charismatic leader Hong Xiuquan, see Jonathan Spence, God's Chinese Son(New York: W. W. Norton 1996).
9. Hsü,The Rise of Modern China, 209.
10. Ibid., 209–11.
11. Bruce Elleman,Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989(New York: Routledge, 2001), 48–50; Hsü,The Rise of Modern China, 212–15.
12. Mary C. Wright,The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ungChih Restoration, 1862–1874, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 233–36.
13. H sü,T he Ri se o f Mo d er n C hina, 215–18.
14. Commenting acidly on the loss of Vladivostok 115 years later (and on President Ford's summit with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in that city), Deng Xiaoping told me that the different names given to the city by the Chinese and the Russians reflected their respective purposes: the Chinese name translated roughly as “Sea Slug,” while the Russian name meant “Rule of the East.” “I don't think it has any other meaning except what it means at face value,” he added.
15. “The New Foreign Policy of January 1861,” in Teng and Fairbank, eds.,China's Response to the West, 48. For consistency within the present volume, the spelling of “Nian” has been changed in this passage from “Nien,” the spelling more common at the time of the "ed book's publication. The underlying Chinese word is the same.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Christopher A. Ford,The Mind of Empire: China's History and Modern Foreign Relations(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2010), 142–43.
20. I am indebted to my associate, Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, for bringing this linguistic point to my attention.
21. This account of Li's career draws on events related in William J. Hail, “Li Hung-Chang,” in Arthur W. Hummel, ed.,Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 464–71; J. O. P. Bland,Li Hung-chang(New York: Henry Holt, 1917); and Edgar Sanderson, ed.,Six Thousand Years of World History, vol. 7,Foreign Statesmen (Philadelphia: E. R. DuMont, 1900), 425–44.
22. Hail, “Li Hung-Chang,” in Hummel, ed.,Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 466.
23. “Excerpts from Tseng's Letters, 1862,” as translated and excerpted in Teng and Fairbank, eds.,China's Response to the West, 62.
24. Li Hung-chang, “Problems of Industrialization,” in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell,Imperial China: The Decline of the Last Dynasty and the Origins of Modern China, the 18th and 19th Centuries(New York: Vintage, 1967), 238.
25. Teng and Fairbank, eds.,China's Response to the West, 87.
26. “Letter to Tsungli Yamen Urging Study of Western Arms,” in ibid., 70–72.
27. “Li Hung-chang's Support of Western Studies,” in ibid., 75.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. As cited in Wright,The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, 222.
31. As cited in Jerome Ch'en,China and the West: Society and Culture, 1815–1937(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), 429.
32. According to the fourteenth-century “Records of the Legitimate Succession of the Divine Sovereigns” (a work later widely distributed in the 1930s by the Thought Bureau of Japan's Ministry of Education): “Japan is the divine country. The heavenly ancestor it was who first laid its foundations, and the Sun Goddess left her descendants to reign over it forever and ever. This is true only of our country, and nothing similar may be found in foreign lands. That is why it is called the divine country.” John W. Dower,War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific Wa(New York: Pantheon, 1986), 222.
33. See Kenneth B. Pyle,Japan Rising(New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 37–38.
34. See Karel van Wolferen,The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation(London: Macmillan, 1989), 13.
35. On the classical conception of a Japancentered tributary order, see Michael R. Auslin,Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 14; and Marius B. Jansen,The Making of Modern Japan(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2000), 69.
36. Jansen,The Making of Modern Japan, 87.
37. Cited in Ch'en,China and the West, 431.
38. Masakazu Iwata,Okubo Toshimichi: The Bismarck of Japan(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), citing Wang Yusheng,China and Japan in the Last Sixty Years(Tientsin: Ta Kung Pao, 1932–34).
39. The occasion of the 1874 crisis was a shipwreck of a Ryukyu Islands crew on the far southeast coast of Taiwan, and the murder of the sailors by a Taiwanese tribe. When Japan demanded a harsh indemnity, Beijing initially responded that it had no jurisdiction over un-Sinicized tribes. In the traditional Chinese view, this had a certain logic: “barbarians” were not Beijing's responsibility. Seen in modern international legal and political terms, it was almost certainly a miscalculation, since it signaled that China did not exert full authority over Taiwan. Japan responded with a punitive expedition against the island, which Qing authorities proved powerless to stop. Tokyo then prevailed on Beijing to pay an indemnity, which one contemporary observer called “a transaction which really sealed the fate of China, in advertising to the world that here was a rich Empire which was ready to pay, but not ready to fight.” (Alexander Michie,An Englishman in China During the Victorian Era, vol. 2 [London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1900], 256.) What made the crisis additionally damaging to China was that until that point, both Beijing and Tokyo had laid claim to the Ryukyu Islands as a tribute state; after the crisis, the islands fell under Japan's sway. See Hsü,The Rise of Modern China, 315–17.
40. Teng and Fairbank, eds., China's Response to the West, 71.
41. As "ed in Bland,Li Hung-chang, 160.
42. Ibid., 160–61.
43. “Text of the Sino-Russian Secret Treaty of 1896,” in Teng and Fairbank, eds.,China's Response to the West, 131.
44. Bland,Li Hung-chang, 306.
45. For an account of these events and of the Chinese court's internal deliberations, see Hsü,The Rise of Modern China, 390–98.
46. In contrast with earlier indemnities, most of the Boxer indemnity was later renounced or redirected by the foreign powers to charitable enterprises within China. The United States directed a portion of its indemnity to the construction of Tsinghua University in Beijing.
47. These strategies are recounted in compelling detail in Scott A. Boorman,The Protracted Game: A Wei-ch'I Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy(New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
48. Jonathan Spence,The Search for Modern China(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 485.
Chapter 4: Mao's Continuous Revolution
1. For Mao on Qin Shihuang, see, for example, “Talks at the Beidaihe Conference: August 19, 1958,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, Timothy Cheek, and Eugene Wu, eds.,The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 405; “Talks at the First Zhengzhou Conference: November 10, 1958,” in MacFarquhar, Cheek, and Wu, eds.,The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao, 476; Tim Adams, “Behold the Mighty Qin,”The Observer(August 19, 2007).
2. André Malraux,Anti-Memoirs, trans. Terence Kilmartin (New York: Henry Holt, 1967), 373–74.
3. “Speech at the Supreme State Conference: Excerpts, 28 January 1958,” in Stuart Schram, ed., MaoTse-tung Unrehearsed: Talks and Letters: 1956–71(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 92–93.
4. “On the People's Democratic Dictatorship: In Commemoration of the Twenty-eighth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China: June 30, 1949,”Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), 412.
5. “Sixty Points on Working Methods—A Draft Resolution from the Office of the Centre of the CPC: 19.2.1958,” in Jerome Ch'en, ed.,Mao Papers: Anthology and Bibliography(London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 63.
6. Ibid., 66.
7. “The Chinese People Have Stood Up: September 1949,” in Timothy Cheek, ed.,Mao Zedong and China's Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents(New York: Palgrave, 2002), 126.
8. See M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes,”International Security30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 56–57; “A Himalayan Rivalry: India and China,”The Economist396, no. 8696 (August 21, 2010), 17–20.
9. Zhang Baijia, “Zhou Enlai—The Shaper and Founder of China's Diplomacy,” in Michael H. Hunt and Niu Jun, eds.,Toward a History of Chinese Communist Foreign Relations, 1920s–1960s: Personalities and Interpretive Approaches(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program, 1992), 77.
10. Charles Hill,Grand Strategies: Literature, Statecraft, and World Order(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 2.
11. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 10, 1971, 12:10–6 p.m.,” in Steven E. Phillips, ed.,Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 17, China 1969–1972, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 404. Zhou Enlai recited these lines during one of our first meeting in Beijing in July 1971.
12. John W. Garver, “China's Decision for War with India in 1962,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds.,New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 107.
13. “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People: February 27, 1957,”Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 417.
14. Edgar Snow,The Long Revolution(New York: Random House, 1972), 217.
15. Lin Piao [Lin Biao],Long Live the Victory of People's War!(Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 38 (originally published September 3, 1965, in the Renmin Ribao[People's Daily]).
16.Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente: Mao's Changing Psyche and Policy Toward the United States, 1969– 1976,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (April 2010).
17. Chen Jian and David L. Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward SinoAmerican Rapprochement, 1968–69,”Cold War International History Project Bulletin11 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1998), 161.
18. Michel Oksenberg, “The Political Leader,” in Dick Wilson, ed.,Mao Tsetung in the Scales of History(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 90.
19. Stuart Schram,The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 23.
20. “The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party: December 1939,”Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 2, 306.
21. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, Feb. 21, 1972, 2:50–3:55 pm.,”FRUS 17, 678.
22. “The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains,”Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 3, 272.
Chapter 5: Triangular Diplomacy and the Korean War
1. “Conversation Between I. V. Stalin and Mao Zedong: Moscow, December 16, 1949,” Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), fond 45, opis 1, delo 329, listy 9–17, trans. Danny Rozas, fromCold War International History Project: Virtual Archive, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, accessed at www.cwihp .org.
2. Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed.,Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament(Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 240.
3. “Conversation Between I. V. Stalin and Mao Zedong,” www.cwihp.org.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. See Chapter 6, “China Confronts Both Superpowers”.
8. “Appendix D to Part II—China: The Military Situation in China and Proposed Military Aid,” inThe China White Paper: August 1949, vol. 2 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 814.
9. “Letter of Transmittal: Washington, July 30, 1949,” inThe China White Paper: August 1949, vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), xvi.
10. Dean Acheson, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,”Department of State Bulletin(January 23, 1950), 113.
11. Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai,Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 98.
12. Acheson, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,” 115.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., 118.
15. The results of postwar Sino-Soviet negotiations still rankled four decades later. In 1989, Deng Xiaoping urged President George H. W. Bush to “look at the map to see what happened after the Soviet Union severed Outer Mongolia from China. What kind of strategic situation did we find ourselves in? Those over fifty i China remember that the shape of China was like a maple leaf. Now, if you look at a map, you see a huge chunk of the north cut away.” George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft,A World Transformed(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 95–96. Deng's reference to China's strategic situation must be understood also in light of the significant Soviet military presence in Mongolia, which began during the SinoSoviet split and lasted throughout the Cold War.
16. Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,Uncertain Partners, 103.
17. Stuart Schram,The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 153.
18. “Conversation Between I. V. Stalin and Mao Zedong,” at www.cwihp.org.
19. Soviet forces had initially advanced further south, past the 38th parallel, but heeded a call from Washington to return north and divide the peninsula roughly halfway.
20. Chen Jian,China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the SinoAmerican Confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 87–88 (citing author interview with Shi Zhe).
21. Kathryn Weathersby, “‘Should We Fear This?’: Stalin and the Danger of War with America,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series, working paper no. 39 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, July 2002), 9–11.
22. “M'Arthur Pledges Defense of Japan,”New York Times (March 2, 1949), fromNew York TimesHistorical Archives.
23. Acheson, “Crisis in Asia—An Examination of U.S. Policy,” 116.
24. Ibid.
25. Weathersby, “‘Should We Fear This?’ ” 11.
26. Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,Uncertain Partners, 144.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 145.
29. Chen,China's Road to the Korean War, 112.
30. Shen Zhihua,Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War, trans. Neil Silver (forthcoming), Chapter 6 (originally published in Chinese asMao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng [Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 2003]).
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Yang Kuisong, Introduction to ibid. (as adapted from Yang Kuisong, “Sidalin Weishenma zhichi Chaoxian zhanzheng—du Shen Zhihua zhu ‘Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian zhanzheng'” [“Why Did Stalin Support the Korean War—On Reading Shen Zhihua's ‘Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War'”],Ershiyi Shiji[Twentieth Century], February 2004).
34. Harry S. Truman, “Statement by the President on the Situation in Korea, June 27, 1950,” no. 173,Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 492.
35. Gong Li, “Tension Across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics,” in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds.,Re-examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 144.
36. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 376(V), “The Problem of the Independence of Korea” (October 7, 1950).
37. For a fascinating discussion of these principles as applied to the Ussuri River clashes, see Michael S. Gerson,The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence,Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969(Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010).
38. On Mao's war aims, see for example Shu Guang Zhang,Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 101–7, 123–25, 132–33; and Chen Jian,Mao's China and the Cold War(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 91–96.
39. Chen,China's Road to the Korean War, 137.
40. Shen,Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War, Chapter 7.
41. Ibid.
42. Chen,China's Road to the Korean War, 143.
43. Ibid., 143–44.
44. Ibid., 144.
45. Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, –Uncertain Partners, 16467.
46. Chen,China's Road to the Korean War,149–50.
47. Ibid., 150.
48. Ibid., 164.
49. “Doc. 64: Zhou Enlai Talk with Indian Ambassador K. M. Panikkar, Oct. 3, 1950,” in Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,Uncertain Partners, 276.
50. Ibid., 278.
51. Ibid. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had written to Zhou, as well as to U.S. and British representatives, regarding prospects for limiting the Korean conflict.
52. “Letter from Fyn Si [Stalin] to Kim Il Sung (via Shtykov): October 8, 1950,” APRF, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 65–67 (relaying text asserted to be Stalin's cable to Mao), fromCold War International History Project: Virtual Archive, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, accessed at www.cwihp.org.
53. Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,Uncertain Partners, 177.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. See Shen Zhihua, “The Discrepancy Between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao's 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar's Reply,”Cold War International History Project Bulletin8/9 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1996), 240.
57. Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,Uncertain Partners, 200–201, citing Hong Xuezhi and Hu Qicai, “Mourn Marshal Xu with Boundless Grief,”Peoples' Daily(October 16, 1990), and Yao Xu,Cong Yalujiang dao Banmendian[From the Yalu River to Panmunjom] (Beijing: People's Press, 1985).
58. Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue,Uncertain Partners, 195–96.
Chapter 6: China Confronts Both Superpowers
1. “Assistant Secretary Dean Rusk addresses China Institute in America, May 18, 1951,” as reproduced in “Editorial Note,” Fredrick Aandahl, ed.,Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1951, vol. 7, Korea and China: Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), 1671–72.
2. Due to differences in dialect and methods of transliteration, Quemoy is elsewhere known as “Jinmen,” “Kinmen,” or “Ch'in-men.” Matsu is also known as “Mazu.”
3. Xiamen was then known in the Western press as “Amoy”; Fuzhou was “Foochow.”
4. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union: February 2, 1953,” no. 6,Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 17.
5. John Lewis Gaddis,The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005), 131.
6. Robert L. Suettinger, “U.S. ‘Management’ of Three Taiwan Strait ‘Crises,’” in Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng with Danielle F. S. Cohen, eds.,Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 254.
7. Ibid., 255.
8. “The Chinese People Cannot Be Cowed by the Atom Bomb: January 28th, 1955 (Main points of conversation with Ambassador Carl-Johan [Cay] Sundstrom, the first Finnish envoy to China, upon presentation of his credentials in Beijing),”Mao Tse-tung: Selected Works, vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 152–53.
9. “Text of the Joint Resolution on the Defense of Formosa: February 7, 1955,”Department of State Bulletin, vol. 32, no. 815 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), 213.
10. “Editorial Note,” in John P. Glennon, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), vol. 19, National Security Policy, 1955–1957 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), 61.
11. Suettinger, “U.S. ‘Management’ of Three Taiwan Strait ‘Crises,’ ” 258.
12. Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed.,Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament(Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 263.
13. “Memorandum of Conversation of N. S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing: 2 October 1959,”Cold War International History Project Bulletin12/13 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Fall/ Winter 2001), 264.
14. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday,Mao: The Unknown Story(New York: Random House, 2005), 389–90.
15. Zhang Baijia and Jia Qingguo, “Steering Wheel, Shock Absorber, and Diplomatic Probe in Confrontation: Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks Seen from the Chinese Perspective,” in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds.,Reexamining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 185.
16. Steven Goldstein, “Dialogue of the Deaf? The Sino-American Ambassadorial-Level Talks, 1955–1970,” in Ross and Jiang, eds.,Re-examining the Cold War, 200. For a compelling history of the talks making use of both Chinese and American sources, see Yafeng Xia,Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949–1972(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
17. “Text of Rusk's Statement to House Panel on U.S. Policy Toward Communist China,”New York Times(April 17, 1966), accessed at ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1851–2007).
18. Ibid.
19. Talbott, trans. and ed.,Khrushchev Remembers, 249.
20. Lo ren z M. Lü t hi,T he Sino-Sovie t S p li t: Co l d War in t he Co m muni s t Wo r l d(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 38.
21. The October Revolution refers to the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917.
22. Stuart Schram,The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 113.
23. Ibid., 149.
24. Lüthi,The Sino-Soviet Split, 50, citing author examination of 1956 Chinese “Internal Reference Reports” and Wu Lengxi,Shinian lunzhan, 1956–1966: ZhongSu guanxi huiyilu[Ten Years of Debate, 1956–1966: Recollections of Sino-Soviet Relations] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1999), (memoirs of the former head of China's official Xinhua news agency).
25. Ibid., 62–63.
26. Talbott, trans. and ed.,Khrushchev Remembers, 255.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 260.
29. “Playing for High Stakes: Khrushchev speaks out on Mao, Kennedy, Nixon and the Cuban Missile Crisis,”LIFE69, no. 25 (December 18, 1970), 25.
30. “First conversation between N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong: 7/31/1958,”Cold War International History Project: Virtual Archive, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, accessed at www.cwihp .org.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. William Taubman,Khrushchev: The Man and His Era(New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 392.
34. “Discussion Between N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong: October 03, 1959,” Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), fond 52, opis 1, delo 499, listy 1–33, trans. Vladislav M. Zubok,Cold War International History Project: Virtual Archive, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, accessed at www.cwihp.org.
35. Ibid.
36. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, 101; Wu Lengxi, “Inside Story of the Decision Making During the Shelling of Jinmen” (Zhuanji wenxue [Biographical Literature], Beijing, no. 1, 1994), as translated and reproduced in Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson, eds., “Mao Zedong's Handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958: Chinese Recollections and Documents,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6/7 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1995), 213–14.
37. Wu, “Inside Story of the Decision Making During the Shelling of Jinmen,” 208.
38. Ibid., 209–10.
39. Gong Li, “Tension Across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics,” in Ross and Jiang, eds.,Re-examining the Cold War, 157–58; Chen Jian,Mao's China and the Cold War(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 184.
40. Chen, Mao'sChina and the Cold War, 184–85.
41. “Statement by the Secretary of State, September 4, 1958,” in Harriet Dashiell Schwar, ed.,Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958–1960, vol. 19, China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 135.
42. “Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, Moscow, September 7, 1958, 9 p.m.,”FRUS19, 151.
43. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Letter to Nikita Khrushchev, Chairman, Council of Ministers, U.S.S.R., on the Formosa Situation: September 13, 1958,” no. 263,Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 702.
44. Andrei Gromyko,Memoirs(New York: Doubleday, 1990), 251–52.
45. Lüthi,The Sino-Soviet Split, 102.
46. Ibid., 102–3.
47. “Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, September 19, 1958, 8 p.m.,” FRUS 19, 236.
48. “Discussion Between N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong: October 03, 1959.”
49. Xia,Negotiating with the Enemy, 98–99.
50. On September 30, 1958, six weeks into the second offshore islands crisis, Dulles gave a press conference in which he questioned the utility of stationing so many Nationalist troops on Quemoy and Matsu, and noted that the United States bore “no legal responsibility to defend the coastal islands.” Chiang Kai-shek responded the next day by dismissing Dulles's remarks as a “unilateral statement” that Taipei “had no obligation to abide by,” and Taipei continued to defend and fortify the islands. Li, “Tension Across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics,” 163.
51. “Memorandum of Conversation, Beijing, February 24, 1972, 5:15–8:05 p.m.,” in Steven E. Phillips, ed.,Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 17, China 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 766.
52. Talbott, trans. and ed.,Khrushchev Remembers, 265.
Chapter 7: A Decade of Crises
1. Frederick C. Teiwes, “The Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime, 1949–1957,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed.,The Politics of China: The.
2. Jonathan Spence,The Search for Modern China(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 541–42.
3. Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 76.
4. Ibid., 84.
5. For an elaboration of this point, and of the links between Mao's foreign and domestic policies, see Chen Jian,Mao's China and the Cold War(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 6–15.
6. Neville Maxwell,India's China War(Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1972), 37.
7. John W. Garver, “China's Decision for War with India in 1962,” in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds.,New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 106.
8. Ibid., 107.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 108.
11. Ibid., 109.
12. Ibid., 110.
13. Ibid., 115.
14. Ibid., 120–21.
15. “Workers of All Countries Unite, Oppose Our Common Enemy: December 15, 1962” (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962) (reprint of editorial from Renmin Ribao [People's Daily]).
16. Ibid.
17. Pravda, April 5, 1964, as "ed in Hemen Ray,Sino-Soviet Conflict over India: An Analysis of the Causes of Conflict Between Moscow and Beijing over India Since 1949(New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1986), 106.
18. John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman,China: A New History, 2nd enlarged edition (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 392.
19. Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenals,Mao's Last Revolution(Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2006), 87–91.
20. Mark Gayn, “China Convulsed,”Foreign Affairs45, issue 2 (January 1967): 247, 252.
21.Renmin Ribao[People's Daily] (Beijing), January 31, 1967, at 6, as cited in Tao-tai Hsia and Constance A. Johnson, “Legal Developments in China Under Deng's Leadership” (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Far Eastern Law Division, 1984), 9.
22. Anne F. Thurston,Enemies of the People(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), 101–3; MacFarquhar and Schoenals,Mao's Last Revolution, 118–20.
23. MacFarquhar and Schoenals,Mao's Last Revolution, 224–27.
24. Ibid., 222–23.
25. See Chapter 14, “Reagan and the Advent of Normalcy”.
26. See Yafeng Xia, moderator,H-Diplo Roundtable Review11, no. 43 (Hu Angang,Mao Zedong yu wenge[Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution])(October 6, 2010), 27–33, accessed at http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/ roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-43. pdf.
27. John F. Kennedy, “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy,”Foreign Affairs36, no. 1 (October 1957): 50.
28. Wu Lengxi, “Inside Story of the Decision Making During the Shelling of Jinmen,” in Li, Chen, and Wilson, eds., “Mao Zedong's Handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958,”CWIHP Bulletin6/7, 208.
29. Yafeng Xia,Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks During the Cold War, 1949–1972(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 109–14, 234; Noam Kochavi,A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 101–14.
30. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks to the American Alumni Council: United States Asian Policy: July 12, 1966,” no. 325,Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), book 2,719–20.
31. Xia,Negotiating with the Enemy, 117–31.
32. “Communist China: 6 December 1960,”National Intelligence Estimate, no. 13–60, 2–3.
33. Li Jie, “Changes in China's Domestic Situation in the 1960s and Sino-U.S. Relations,” in Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds.,Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954–1973(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 302.
34. Ibid., 304.
35. Ibid., 185, 305.
Chapter 8: The Road to Reconciliation
1. Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Viet Nam,”Foreign Affairs46, no. 1 (October 1967): 121.
2. Ibid., 123.
3. Edgar Snow, “Interview with Mao,”The New Republic152, no. 9, issue 2623 (February 27, 1965): 21–22.
4. The extent of Chinese support is shown in the records of recently declassified conversations between Chinese and Vietnamese leaders. For a compilation of key conversations with editorial commentary, see Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tønnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, eds., “77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series, working paper no. 22 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1998). For an analysis of the People's Republic's involvement in Hanoi's wars with France and the United States, see Qiang Zhai,China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
5. Zhang Baijia, “China's Role in the Korean and Vietnam Wars,” in Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng with Danielle F. S. Cohen, eds.,Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 201.
6. Snow, “Interview with Mao,” 22.
7. Ibid., 23.
8. Yawei Liu, “Mao Zedong and the United States: A Story of Misperceptions,” in Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong, eds.,Image, Perception, and the Making ofU.S.-China Relations (Lanham: University Press of America, 1998), 202.
9. Lyndon B. Johnson, “Address at Johns Hopkins University: Peace Without Conquest: April 7, 1965,” no. 172,Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 395.
10. “Text of Rusk's Statement to House Panel on U.S. Policy Toward Communist China,”New York Times(April 17, 1966), accessed at ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1851–2007).
11. Liu, “Mao Zedong and the United States,” 203.
12. Chen Jian and David L. Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward SinoAmerican Rapprochement, 1968–69,”Cold War International History Project Bulletin11 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1998), 161.
13. Ibid., 158.
14. Ibid.
15. As described by Donald Zagoria in a farsighted article in 1968, an influential cross-section of the Chinese leadership, including Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi, favored a conditional reconciliation with Moscow. In a conclusion that outpaced the analysis of many observers, Zagoria suggested that strategic necessities would ultimately drive China toward reconciliation with the United States. Donald S. Zagoria, “The Strategic Debate in Peking,” in Tang Tsou, ed.,China in Crisis, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).
16. Chen and Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos,” 161.
17. Richard Nixon, “Inaugural Address: January 20, 1969,” no. 1,Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 3.
18. See Henry Kissinger,White House Years(Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 168.
19. Chen Jian,Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 245–46.
20. Chen and Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos,” 166.
21. Ibid., 167.
22. Ibid., 170.
23. Ibid., 168.
24. Xiong Xianghui, “The Prelude to the Opening of Sino-American Relations,”Zhonggong dangshi ziliao[CCP History Materials], no. 42 (June 1992), 81, as excerpted in William Burr, ed., “New Documentary Reveals Secret U.S., Chinese Diplomacy Behind Nixon's Trip,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, no. 145 (December 21, 2004), http://www.gwu .edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/ index.htm.
25. Ibid.
26. Chen and Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos,” 170.
27. Ibid., 171.
28. Ibid.
29. For an account of the incident synthesizing recent scholarship, see Michael S. Gerson,The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, and the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010), 23–24.
30. See Kissinger,White House Years, 182.
31. “Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting, Subject: U.S. Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences (NSSM 63),” 134–35. See also Gerson,The SinoSoviet Border Conflic, 37–38.
32. Elliot L. Richardson, “The Foreign Policy of the Nixon Administration: Address to the American Political Science Association, September 5, 1969,”Department of State Bulletin61, no. 1567 (September 22, 1969), 260.
33. Gerson,The Sino-Soviet Border Conflic, 49–52.
34. “Jing Zhicheng, Attaché, Chinese Embassy, Warsaw on: The Fashion Show in Yugoslavia,”Nixon's China Game, pbs.org, September 1999, accessed at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/ china/filmmore/reference/interview/ zhicheng01.html.
35. Ibid.
36. “Memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, March 10, 1970,” in Steven E. Phillips, ed.,Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 17, China 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office 2006). 188–91.
37. See Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente: Mao's Changing Psyche and Policy To ward the United States, 1969–1976,”Diplomatic History34, no. 2 (April 2010).
38. Edgar Snow, “A Conversation with Mao Tse-Tung,” LIFE70, no. 16 (April 30, 1971), 47.
39. Ibid., 48.
40. Ibid., 46.
41. Ibid., 48.
42. Ibid., 47.
43. Ibid., 48.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. See Zhengyuan Fu,Autocratic Tradition and Chinese Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 188; and Ross Terrill,Madame Mao: The White-Boned Demon(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 344.
47.Oxford Concise English-Chinese/Chinese- English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1999), 474. I am indebted to my research assistant, Schuyler Schouten, for the linguistic analysis.
48. “Editorial Note,”FRUS17, 239–40.
49. “Tab B.,”FRUS17, 250.
50. Ibid.
51. Snow, “A Conversation with Mao Tse-Tung,” 47.
52. “Tab A.,”FRUS 17, 249.
53. “Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 12, 1971,” FRUS 17, 254.
54. Yang and Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente,” 401–2.
55. See Kissinger,White House Years, 710.
56. “Message from the Premier of the People's Republic of China Chou En-lai to President Nixon, Beijing, April 21, 1971,”FRUS17, 301.
57. Ibid.
58. See Kissinger,White House Years, 720.
59. “Message from the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China, Washington, May 10, 1971,”FRUS17, 318.
60. “Message from the Premier of the People's Republic of China Chou En-lai to President Nixon, Beijing, May 29, 1971,”FRUS17, 332.
Chapter 9: Resumption of Relations: First Encounters with Mao and Zhou
1. “Answers to the Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci: April 21 and 23, 1980,” inSelected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975–1982), vol. 2, trans. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 326–27.
2. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35–11:20 p.m.,” in Steven E. Phillips, ed.,Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 17,China 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,2006), 363.
3. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, October 21, 1971, 10:30 a.m.–1:45 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 504. The original American records of these conversations list the name “Zhou” using the then-prevalent Wade-Giles transliteration “Chou.” To avoid frequent shifts in spelling between the present volume's main text and the "ed conversations, in passages excerpted from American transcripts the names of Chinese interlocutors, as well as Chinese-language words originally spoken by Chinese parties, have been rendered using pinyin spellings.
4. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.,” in David P. Nickles, ed.,Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 18, China 1973–1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 124.
5. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35–11:20 p.m.,”FRUS17, 367.
6. Ibid., 390.
7. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 10, 1971, 12:10–6:00 p.m.,” FRUS17, 400.
8. Shortly after my July 1971 visit, Zhou flew to Hanoi to brief North Vietnamese leaders on China's new diplomatic posture. By most accounts, these talks did not proceed smoothly; nor did Zhou's subsequent discussions with Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, the implacable shadow foreign minister of the Hanoi front “Provisional Revolutionary Government” of South Vietnam. See Chen Jian, “China, Vietnam and Sino-American Rapprochement,” in Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge, eds.,The Third Indochina War: Conflict Between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–1979 (London: Routledge, 2006), 53–54; and Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 196–97.
9. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 9, 1971, 4:35–11:20 p.m.,”FRUS17, 367–68.
10. Ibid., 367.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 369.
13. “Memorandum of Conversation: Shanghai, February 28, 1972, 8:30–9:30 a.m.,”FRUS17, 823.
14. A partial record of this luncheon discussion is available in FRUS17, 416.
15. In the years since, Fujian has become a center of cross-Strait trade and tourism links, including via Quemoy and Matsu.
16. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 10, 1971, 12:10–6:00 p.m.,”FRUS17, 403–4.
17. Chen Jian,Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 267.
18. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, July 10, 1971, 12:10–6:00 p.m.,”FRUS17, 430–31.
19. Margaret MacMillan,Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World(New York: Random House, 2007), 22.
20. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 21, 1972, 2:50–3:55 p.m.,”FRUS17, 681.
21. Ibid., 678–79.
22. Ibid., 681.
23. Ibid., 680.
24. Ibid., 681–82.
25. Edward (Ted) Heath, British Prime Minister from 1970 to 1974. Heath would later visit Beijing and meet with Mao in 1974 and 1975.
26. Charles de Gaulle, French resistance leader and President from 1959 to 1969. Paris had recognized the People's Republic of China in 1964.
27. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 21, 1972, 2:50–3:55 p.m.,”FRUS17, 679–80.
28. Ibid., 684.
29. Ibid., 683.
30. Ibid.
31. “Conversation Between President Nixon and the Ambassador to the Republic of China (McConaughy): Washington, June 30, 1971, 12:18–12:35 p.m.,”FRUS17, 349.
32. Ibid., 351–52.
33. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 21, 1972, 5:58–6:55 p.m.,”FRUS17, 688.
34. Ibid., 689.
35. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 22, 1972, 2:10–6:00 p.m.,” FRUS 17, 700.
36. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 24, 1972, 5:15–8:05 p.m.,”FRUS17, 770.
37. “Memorandum of Conversation: Washington, February 14, 1972, 4:09–6:19 p.m.,”FRUS 17, 666.
38. See, for example, Gao Wenqian,Zhou Enlai, 151–53, 194–200.
39. See Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente: Mao's Changing Psyche and Policy Toward the United States, 1969– 1976,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (April 2010): 407.
40. “Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People's Republic of China: Shanghai, February 27, 1972,”FRUS17, 812–16.
41. Ibid., 814.
42. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 22, 1972, 2:10–6:00 p.m.,”FRUS17, 697.
43. “Joint Statement Following Discussions with Leaders of the People's Republic of China: Shanghai, February 27, 1972,”FRUS17, 815.
44. CCP Central Committee, “Notice on the Joint Sino-American Communiqué, March 7, 1972,” as translated and "ed in Yang and Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente,” 395.
Chapter 10: The Quasi-Alliance: Conversations with Mao
1. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.,” in David P. Nickles, ed.,Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 18, China 1973–1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 124.
2. Ibid., 124–25.
3. Ibid., 381.
4. Ibid., 387–88.
5. George Kennan's 1946 “Long Telegram” from Moscow and his nominally anonymous 1947Foreign Affairsarticle, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” argued that the Soviet Union was driven by ideology to implacable hostility to the United States and the West, and that Soviet-led Communism would expand wherever not met by a resolute response. Though Kennan posited that Soviet pressure could be “contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points,” his theory of containment was not primarily a military doctrine; it placed significant weight on the use of diplomatic pressure and the power of internal political and social reform in the non-Communist world as a bulwark against Soviet expansion.
6. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, November 12, 1973, 5:40–8:25 p.m.,”FRUS18, 385.
7. Ibid., 389.
8. The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, then a separate state aligned with Moscow.
9. “Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon: Washington, November 1971,” in Steven E.Phillips, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 17, China 1969–1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 548.
10. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, November 12, 1973, 5:40–8:25 p.m.,”FRUS18, 391.
11. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.,”FRUS18, 125.
12. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, November 12, 1973, 5:40–8:25 p.m.,”FRUS18, 131. According to some accounts, Mao's list of the countries in the horizontal line included China. The word was not translated and did not appear in the American transcript of the conversation. China's inclusion was at least implied by the presence of countries to China's east and west.
13. Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente: Mao's Changing Psyche and Policy To ward the United States, 1969–1976,”Diplomatic History34, no. 2 (April 2010): 408.
14. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, October 21, 1975, 6:25–8:05 p.m.,”FRUS18, 794.
15. Yang and Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente,” 413.
16. Ibid., 414.
17. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 15, 1973, 5:57–9:30 p.m.,”FRUS18, 38.
18. Ibid., 32.
19. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, February 17–18, 1973, 11:30 p.m.–1:20 a.m.,”FRUS18, 137.
20. See Chapter 13, “ ‘Touching the Tiger's Buttocks': The Third Vietnam War,” and Henry Kissinger,Years of Upheaval(Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 16–18, 339–67.
21. The Chinese analysis proved less accurate than usual for the long term, since the Helsinki Accords, signed in 1975, are now generally recognized as having been a major element in weakening Soviet control of Eastern Europe.
Chapter 11: The End of the Mao Era
1. Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969–1982,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed.,The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 278–81, 299–301. In quest of finding a successor among China's “pure” young generation,Mao elevated the thirty-seven-year-old Wang Hongwen, previously distinguished only as a provincial-level leftist organizer, to the third-ranking position in the Communist Party hierarchy. His meteoric rise baffled many observers. Closely aligned with Jiang Qing, Wang never achieved an independent political identity or authority commensurate with his formal position. He fell with the rest of the Gang of Four in October 1976.
2. This comparison is elaborated, among other places, in David Shambaugh, “Introduction: Assessing Deng Xiaoping's Legacy” and Lucian W. Pye, “An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China's Political Culture,” in David Shambaugh, ed.,Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 1–2, 14.
3. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, November 14, 1973, 7:35–8:25 a.m.,” in David P. Nickles, ed.,Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976, vol. 18, China 1973–1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), 430.
4. “Memorandum from Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger, Washington, January 25, 1974,”FRUS 18, 455.
5. Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating Between Revolution and Détente: Mao's Changing Psyche and Policy Toward the United States, 1969– 1976,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (April 2010): 414. The proceedings of this meeting have not been published. The "ation draws on an unpublished memoir by the senior Chinese diplomat Wang Youping, who was privy to Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua's summary of the Politburo meeting.
6. Chou Enlai, “Report on the Work of the Government: January 13, 1975,”Peking Review4 (January 24, 1975), 21–23.
7. Ibid, 23.
8. “Speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Teng Hsiao-Ping, at the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly: April 10, 1974” (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1974).
9. Ibid., 5.
10. Ibid., 6.
11. Ibid., 8.
12. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, October 21, 1975, 6:25–8:05 p.m.,”FRUS18, 788–89.
13. Ibid., 788.
14. Ibid., 789.
15. Ibid., 793.
16. Ibid. In 1940, Britain withdrew its expeditionary force after the Battle of France.
17. Ibid., 794.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., 791.
20. Ibid., 792.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 790.
23. Ibid., 791.
24. Ibid.
25. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, October 25, 1975, 9:30 a.m.,”FRUS18, 832.
26. Ibid.
27. “Paper Prepared by the Director of Policy Planning Staff (Lord), Washington, undated,”FRUS 18, 831.
28. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, December 2, 1975, 4:10–6:00 p.m.,” FRUS 18, 858.
29. Ibid., 859.
30. A companion of Mao's in Yan'an during the civil war; a former general, now ambassador in Washington.
31. Wang Hairong and Nancy Tang.
32. Qiao Guanhua, Foreign Minister.
33. “Memorandum of Conversation: Beijing, December 2, 1975, 4:10–6:00 p.m.,” FRUS 18, 859.
34. Ibid., 867.
35. Some of the texts leveled harsh criticism against the excesses of Qin Shihuang and the Tang Dynasty Empress Wu Zetian, rhetorical stand-ins for Mao and Jiang Qing respectively.
36. See Henry Kissinger,Years of Renewal(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 897.
Chapter 12: The Indestructible Deng
1. Richard Evans,Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China(New York: Viking, 1993), 186–87.
2. See, for example, “The Army Needs to Be Consolidated: January 25, 1975,”Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping: 1975–1982, vol. 2, trans. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 11–13; and “Some Problems Outstanding in the Iron and Steel Industry: May 29, 1975,” in ibid., 18–22.
3. “The Whole Party Should Take the Overall Interest into Account and Push the Economy Forward: March 5, 1975,” in ibid., 14–17.
4. “Priority Should Be Given to Scientific Research: September 26, 1975,” http:// web.peopledaily.com.cn/english/dengxp/ vol2/text/b1080.html.
5. “The Army Needs to Be Consolidated: January 25, 1975,” inSelected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 13.
6. “Things Must Be Put in Order in All Fields: September 27 and October 4, 1975,” in ibid., 47.
7. Deng Xiaoping, “Memorial Speech,” as reproduced inChina Quarterly65 (March 1976): 423.
8. “The ‘Two Whatevers’ Do Not Accord with Marxism: May 24, 1977,” inSelected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 51, note 1 ("ing February 1977 editorial advancing the principle); see also Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969–1982,” in Roderick MacFarquhar, ed.,The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 312–13.
9. MacFarquhar, “The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969–1982,” in MacFarquhar, ed.,The Politics of China, 312.
10. “Speech at the All-Army Conference on Political Work: June 2, 1978,” inSelected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 132.
11. “The ‘Two Whatevers’ Do Not Accord with Marxism: May 24, 1977,” in ibid., 51.
12. “Respect Knowledge, Respect Trained Personnel: May 24, 1977,” in ibid., 53.
13. Stanley Karnow, “Our Next Move on China,”New York Times (August 14, 1977); Jonathan Spence,The Search for Modern China(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 632.
14. See Lucian W. Pye, “An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China's Political Culture,” in David Shambaugh, ed.,Deng Xiaoping: Portrait of a Chinese Statesman(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006).
15. “Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts and Unite As One in Looking into the Future: December 13, 1978,” inSelected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 152.
16. Ibid., 154.
17. Ibid.
18. “Uphold the Four Cardinal Principles: March 30, 1979,” inSelected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 2, 181.
19. Ibid., 181.
20. Ibid., 182–83.
21. Until 1983, Deng was Vice Premier and Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress. From 1981 to 1989, he was Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Chairman of the Advisory Commission.
22. Evans, DengXiaoping and the Making of Modern China, 256.
Chapter 13:“Touching the Tiger's Buttocks”: The Third Vietnam War
1. “Touch the tiger's buttocks” is a Chinese idiom popularized by Mao, meaning to do something daring or dangerous. The occasion of this remark was my meeting with Hua Guofeng in Beijing in April 1979.
2. During the Cultural Revolution, then Defense Minister Lin Biao abolished all ranks and insignia and ordered extensive ideological training for Chinese troops using the “Little Red Book” of Mao's aphorisms. The PLA was called on to play social and ideological roles far outside the mission of an ordinary military. A penetrating account of the toll these developments took on the PLA during the conflict with Vietnam may be found in Edward O'Dowd,Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War(New York: Routledge, 2007).
3. “Zhou Enlai, Kang Sheng, and Pham Van Dong: Beijing, 29 April 1968,” in Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tønnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, eds., “77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series, working paper no. 22 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International History Project, May 1998), 127–28. (Brackets in original.)
4. I have always believed that having been willing to force the-to Mao- ideologically correct Khmer Rouge into a compromise, unnecessarily as it turned out, contributed to Zhou's fall. See also Kissinger,Years of Upheaval(Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), 368.
5. Robert S. Ross,The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy, 1975–1979(New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 74, "ing Xinhua news report (August 15, 1975), as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Report, People's Republic of China (August 18, 1975), A7.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 98, "ing Xinhua news report (March 15, 1976), as translated in FBIS Daily Report, People's Republic of China (March 16, 1976), A13.
8. In April 1978, the Afghan President was assassinated and his government was replaced; on December 5, 1978, the Soviet Union and the new government of Afghanistan entered into a Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation; and on February 19, 1979, the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan was assassinated.
9. Cyrus Vance,Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 79.
10. “President Carter's Instructions to Zbigniew Brzezinski for His Mission to China, May 17, 1978,” in Zbigniew Brzezinski,Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1985), Annex I, 2.
11. The five principles were: affirmation of a one China policy; a commitmen not to offer American support to Taiwan independence movements; American discouragement of a hypothetical Japanese deployment into Taiwan; support for any peaceful resolution between Beijing and Taipei; and a commitment to continued normalization. See Chapter 9, “Resumption of Relations: First Encounters with Mao and Zhou,” page 271.
12. “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the President's Meeting with the People's Republic of China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Washington, January, 29th 1979, 3:35–4:59 p.m.,” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library (JCPL), Vertical File—China, item no. 270, 10–11.
13. “Summary of Dr. Brzezinski's Meeting with Foreign Minister Huang Hua: Beijing, May 21st, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 232, 3.
14. Ibid., 6–7.
15. Ibid. Sadat served as President of Egypt from 1970 until his assassination in 1981. The “bold action” referred to included Sadat's expulsion of over twenty thousand Soviet military advisors from Egypt in 1972, the launching of the October 1973 War, and the subsequent entry into a peace process with Israel.
16. Ibid., 4.
17. Ibid., 10–11.
18. “Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao P'ing: Beijing, May 21st, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 232-e, 16.
19. Ibid., 5–6.
20. “Summary of Dr. Brzezinski's Meeting with Chairman Hua Kuo-feng: Beijing, May 22nd, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File-China, item no. 233c, 4–5.
21. “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the President's Meeting with Ambassador Ch'ai Tse-min: Washington, September 19, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 250b, 3.
22. “Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao P'ing: Beijing, May 21st 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 232-e, 6.
23. In recent years, Chinese leaders and policy analysts have introduced the phrase “peaceful rise” to describe China's foreign policy aspiration to achieve major-power status within the framework of the existing international system. In a thoughtful article synthesizing both Chinese and Western scholarship on the concept, the scholar Barry Buzan raises the prospect that China's “peaceful rise” began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as Deng increasingly aligned China's domestic development and foreign policy to the nonrevolutionary world and sought out common interests with the West. Deng's trips abroad offered dramatic proof of this realignment. See Barry Buzan, “China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise' Possible?”The Chinese Journal of International Politics3 (2010): 12–13.
24. “An Interview with Teng Hsiao P'ing,”Time (February 5, 1979), http://www .time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,946204,00.html.
25. “China and Japan Hug and Make Up,”Time(November 6, 1978), http://www .time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,948275-1,00.html.
26. Henry Kamm, “Teng Begins Southeast Asian Tour to Counter Rising Soviet Influence,”New York Times(November 6, 1978), A1.
27. Henry Kamm, “Teng Tells the Thais Moscow-Hanoi Treaty Perils World's Peace,” New York Times(November 9, 1978), A9.
28. “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai: January 18–February 21, 1992,” inSelected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, trans., The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), 366.
29. Lee Kuan Yew,From Third World to First: The Singapore Story—1965–2000(New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 597.
30. Ibid., 598–99.
31. Fox Butterfield, “Differences Fade as Rivals Mingle to Honor Teng,”New York Times (January 30, 1979), A1.
32. Joseph Lelyveld, “‘Astronaut’ Teng Gets New View of World in Houston,”New York Times(February 3, 1979), A1.
33. Fox Butterfield, “Teng Again Says Chinese May Move Against Vietnam,”New York Times (February 1, 1979), A16.
34. Joseph Lelyveld, “‘Astronaut' Teng Gets New View of World in Houston,” A1. For consistency with the main text of the present volume, the "ed passage's original spelling “Teng Hsiao-p'ing” has been rendered as “Deng Xiaoping.”
35. Twenty-two years represented the interval between the two world wars. Since more than twenty-two years had elapsed since the end of the Second World War, Chinese leaders were nervous that a certain historical rhythm was moving events. Mao had made the same point to the Australian Communist leader E. F. Hill a decade earlier. See also Chapter 8, “The Road to Reconciliation,” page 207; and Chen Jian and David L. Wilson, eds., “All Under the Heaven Is Great Chaos: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–69,”Cold War International History Project Bulletin11 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1998), 161.
36. “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the President's First Meeting with PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Washington, January 29th, 1979,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 268, 8–9.
37. “Memorandum of Conversation, Meeting with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao P'ing: Beijing, May 21st, 1978,” JCPL, Vertical File—China, item no. 232-e, 14.
38. “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the President's Meeting with the People's Republic of China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Washington, January 29th, 1979, 3:35–4:59 p.m.,” JCPL, Vertical File-China, item no. 270, 10–11.
39. “Memorandum of Conversation, Carter–Deng, Subject: Vietnam: Washington, January 29th, 1979, 5:00 p.m.–5:40 p.m.,” JCPL, Brzezinski Collection, China [PRC] 12/19/78–10/3/79, item no. 007, 2.
40. Ross,The Indochina Tangle, 229.
41. “Memorandum of Conversation, Carter–Deng, Washington, January 29th, 1979, 5:00 p.m.–5:40 p.m.,” JCPL, Brzezinski Collection, China [PRC] 12/19/78–10/3/79, item no. 007, 2.
42. Ibid., 5.
43. Brzezinski, Power and Principle, 410.
44. “President Reporting on His Conversations with Deng: January 30th, 1979,” JCPL, Brzezinski Collection, China [PRC] 12/19/78–10/3/79, item no. 009, 1.
45. Henry Scott-Stokes, “Teng Criticizes the U.S. for a Lack of Firmness in Iran,”New York Times(February 8, 1979), A12.
46. The lower figure appears in Bruce Elleman,Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989(New York: Routledge, 2001), 285. The higher figure is the estimate of Edward O'Dowd inChinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War, 3, 45–55.
47. O'Dowd,Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War, 45.
48. Deng Xiaoping to Jimmy Carter on January 30, 1979, as "ed in Brzezinski,Power and Principle, 409–10.
49. “Text of Declaration by Moscow,”New York Times(February 19, 1979); Craig R. Whitney, “Security Pact Cited: Moscow Says It Will Honor Terms of Treaty—No Direct Threat Made,”New York Times(February 19, 1979), A1.
50. Edward Cowan, “Blumenthal Delivers Warning,”New York Times(February 28, 1979), A1.
51. Ibid.
52. One of the few scholars to challenge this conventional wisdom—and to emphasize the conflict's anti-Soviet dimension—is Bruce Elleman, in hisModern Chinese Warfare, 284–97.
53. “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the President's First Meeting with PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Washington, January 29th, 1979,” JCPL, Vertical File-China, item no. 268, 8.
54. “Memorandum, President Reporting on His Conversations with Deng: January 30th, 1979,” JCPL, Brzezinski Collection, China [PRC] 12/19/ 78–10/3/79, item no. 009, 2.
55. “Memorandum of Conversation with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Beijing, January 8th, 1980,” JCPL, NSA Brzez. Matl. Far East, Box No. 69, Brown (Harold) Trip Memcons, 1/80, File, 16.
56. “Memorandum of Conversation with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Beijing, January 8th, 1980,” JCPL, NSA Brzez. Matl. Far East, Box No. 69, Brown (Harold) Trip Memcons, 1/80, File, 15.
57. “President Carter's Instructions to Zbigniew Brzezinski for His Mission to China, May 17, 1978,” in Brzezinski,Power and Principle, Annex I, 4.
58. By one estimate, as of 1986 Vietnam stationed “700,000 combat troops in the northern portion of the country.” Karl D. Jackson, “Indochina, 1982–1985: Peace Yields to War,” in Solomon and Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far EastMilitary Buildup, as cited in Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 206.
59. “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of the Vice President's Meeting with People's Republic of China Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping: Beijing, August 28th, 1979, 9:30 a.m.– 12:00 noon,” JCPL, Vertical File-China, item no. 279, 9.
60. “Memorandum of Conversation Between President Carter and Premier Hua Guofeng of the People's Republic of China: Tokyo, July 10th, 1980,” JCPL, NSA Brzez. Matl. Subj. File, Box No. 38, “Memcons: President, 7/80.”
62. As "ed in Chen Jian,China's Road to the Korean War(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 149.
62. “Memorandum of Conversation, Summary of Dr. Brzezinski's Conversation with Vice Premier Geng Biao of the People's Republic of China: Washington, May 29th, 1980,” JCPL, NSA Brzez. Matl. Far East, Box No. 70, “Geng Biao Visit, 5/23–31/80,” Folder, 5.
63. Lee, FromThird World to First, 603.
Chapter 14: Reagan and the Advent of Normalcy
1. George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft,A World Transformed(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 93–94.
2. Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, §3.1.
3. Joint Communiqué Issued by the Governments of the United States and the People's Republic of China (August 17, 1982), as printed in Alan D. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 243.
4. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker,Strait Talk: United States–Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 151.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 148–50.
7. John Lewis Gaddis,The Cold War: A New History(New York: Penguin, 2005), 213–14, note 43.
8. Hu Yaobang, “Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization—Report to the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China: September 1, 1982,”Beijing Review 37(September 13, 1982): 29.
9. Ibid., 30–31.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Charles Hill, “Shifts in China's Foreign Policy: The US and USSR” (April 21, 1984), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (hereafter RRPL), 90946 (Asian Affairs Directorate, NSC).
13. Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, “China-USSR: Maneuvering in the Triangle” (December 20, 1985), RRPL, 007-R.
14. “Memorandum to President Reagan from Former President Nixon,” as appended to Memorandum for the President from William P. Clark, re: Former President Nixon's Trip to China (September 25, 1982), RRPL, William Clark Files, 002.
15. George P. Shultz,Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 382.
16. Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at Fudan University in Shanghai, April 30, 1984,”Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), book 1, 603–8; “Remarks to Chinese Community Leaders in Beijing, April 27, 1984,”Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, book 1, 579–84.
17. Donald Zagoria, “China's Quiet Revolution,”Foreign Affairs62, no. 4 (April 1984): 881.
18. Jonathan Spence,The Search for Modern China(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 654–55.
19. Nicholas Kristof, “Hu Yaobang, Ex- Party Chief in China, Dies at 73,”New York Times (April 16, 1989), http://www .nytimes.com/1989/04/16/obituaries/ hu-yaobang-ex-party-chief-in-chinadies-at-73.html?pagewanted=1.
20. Christopher Marsh,Unparalleled Reforms(New York: Lexington, 2005), 41.
Chapter 15: Tiananmen
1. Jonathan Spence notes that 1989 represented a convergence of several politically charged anniversaries: it was “the two hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution, the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth movement, the fortieth birthday of the People's Republic itself, and the passage of ten years since formal diplomatic relations with the United States had been reinstituted.” Spence,The Search for Modern China(New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 696.
2. Andrew J. Nathan, “Preface to the Paperback Edition: The Tiananmen Papers—An Editor's Reflections,” in Zhang Liang, Andrew Nathan, and Perry Link, eds.,The Tiananmen Papers(New York: Public Affairs, 2001), viii.
3. Richard Baum,Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 254.
4. Nathan, Introduction toThe Tiananmen Papers, “The Documents and Their Significance,” lv.
5. An example of one such attempt to implement conditionality was the Clinton administration's policy of conditioning China's Most Favored Nation trade status on changes in its human rights record, to be discussed more fully in Chapter 17, “A Roller Coaster Ride Toward Another Reconciliation: The Jiang Zemin Era.”
6. David M. Lampton, Same Bed,Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 305.
7. George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft,A World Transformed(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 89–90.
8. Ibid., 97–98.
9. Congress and the White House shared a concern that visiting students who had publicly protested in the United States would be subject to punishment on their return to China. The President had signaled that applications for visa extensions would be treated favorably, while Congress sought to grant the extensions without requiring an application.
10. Bush and Scowcroft,A World Transformed, 100.
11. Ibid., 101.
12. Ibid., 102.
13. Ibid.
14. Lampton,Same Bed, Different Dreams, 302.
15. Bush and Scowcroft,A World Transformed, 105–6. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen disputes this account in his memoirs, averring that the plane was never in any danger. Qian Qichen,Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 133.
16. Bush and Scowcroft,A World Transformed, 106.
17. Ibid.
18. Qian, Ten Episodes inChina's Diplomacy, 134.
19. Bush and Scowcroft,A World Transformed, 109.
20. Ibid., 107.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 107–8.
23. Ibid., 107–9.
24. Ibid., 110.
25. Deng had made clear that he intended to retire very shortly. He did, in fact, do so in 1992, though he continued to be regarded as an influential arbiter of policy.
26. The five principles of peaceful coexistence were negotiated by India and China in 1954. They concerned coexistence and mutual noninterference between countries with different ideological orientations.
27. Deng made a similar point to Richard Nixon during the latter's October 1989 private visit to Beijing: “Please tell President Bush let's end the past, the United States ought to take the initiative, and only the United States can take the initiative. The United States is able to take the initiative. . . . China is unable to initiate. This is because the stronger is America, the weaker is China, the injured is China. If you want China to beg, it cannot be done. If it drags on a hundred years, the Chinese people can't beg [you] to end sanctions [against China]. . . . Whatever Chinese leader makes a mistake in this respect would surely fall, the Chinese people will not forgive him.” As "ed in Lampton,Same Bed, Different Dreams, 29.
28. Some in the White House maintained that it was unnecessarily provocative to invite Fang Lizhi to attend a presidential banquet with the same Chinese authorities he was criticizing. They blamed the American Embassy in Beijing for failing to forewarn them of the impending controversy. In including Fang on the list of potential invitees, the American ambassador in Beijing, Winston Lord, had in fact flagged him as an outspoken dissident whose inclusion might provoke Chinese government consternation, but who nonetheless merited an invitation.
29. “Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, SITREP No. 49, June 12, 0500 Local (June 11, 1989),” in Jeffrey T. Richardson and Michael L. Evans, eds.,Tiananmen Square, 1989: The Declassified Histor, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 16 (June 1, 1999), Document 26.
30. Bush and Scowcroft,A World Transformed, 99.
31. U.S. Embassy Beijing Cable, “China and the U.S.—A Protracted Engagement,” July 11, 1989, SECRET, in Michael L. Evans, ed.,The U.S. Tiananmen Papers: New Documents Reveal U.S. Perceptions of 1989 Chinese Political Crisis, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book (June 4, 2001), Document 11.
32. Bush and Scowcroft,A World Transformed, 101–2.
33. Qian,Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy, 140.
34. Bush and Scowcroft,A World Transformed, 174.
35. Ibid., 176–77.
36. Fang and his wife would ultimately depart China for the U.K. on an American military transport plane. They subsequently relocated to the United States, where Fang became a professor of physics at the University of Arizona.
37. Richard Evans,Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993), 304 ("ingZheng Ming, Hong Kong, May 1, 1990).
38. “Deng Initiates New Policy ‘Guiding Principle,' ” FBIS-CHI-91-215; see also United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military Power of the People's Republic of China: A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2000” (2007), 7, http://www.defense.gov/ pubs/pdfs/070523-china-military-powerfinal. pdf.
Chapter 16: What Kind of Reform? Deng's Southern Tour
1. Richard Baum,Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 334.
2. “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai: January 18–February 21, 1992,”Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, trans., The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), 359.
3. Ibid., 360.
4. Ibid., 361.
5. Ibid., 362–63.
6. Ibid, 364–65.
7. Ibid., 366.
8. David M. Lampton,Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), xi.
9. “Excerpts from Talks Given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai: January 18—February 21, 1992,”Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 370.
10. Ibid., 369.
Chapter 17: A Roller Coaster Ride Toward Another Reconciliation: The Jiang Zemin Era
1. See David M. Lampton,Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 293, 308.
2. State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “China: Aftermath of the Crisis” (July 27, 1989), 17, in Jeffrey T. Richardson and Michael L. Evans, eds., “Tiananmen Square, 1989: The Declassified History,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book no. 16 (June 1, 1999), Document 36.
3. Steven Mufson, “China's Economic ‘Boss': Zhu Rongji to Take Over as Premier,”Washington Post(March 5, 1998), A1.
4. September 14, 1992, statement, as "ed in A. M. Rosenthal, “On My Mind: Here We Go Again,” New York Times(April 9, 1993); on divergent Chinese and Western interpretations of this statement, see also Lampton,Same Bed, Different Dreams, 32.
5. “Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World,” President Clinton Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York City, September 27, 1993, fromDepartment of State Dispatch 4, no. 39 (September 27, 1993).
6. Robert Suettinger,Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2003), 161.
7. Deng Xiaoping had given a speech in November 1989 calling on China to “Adhere to Socialism and Prevent Peaceful Evolution toward Capitalism.” Mao had warned repeatedly against “peaceful evolution” as well. See “Mao Zedong and Dulles's ‘Peaceful Evolution' Strategy: Revelations from Bo Yibo's Memoirs,”Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6/7 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Winter 1996/1997), 228.
8. Reflecting this fact, “Most Favored Nation” has since been technically renamed “Permanent Normal Trade Relations,” although the “MFN” label remains in use.
9. Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” address at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington,D.C., September 21, 1993, fromDepartment of State Dispatch4, no. 39 (September 27, 1993).
10. Suettinger,Beyond Tiananmen, 165.
11. William J. Clinton, “Statement on Most-Favored-Nation Trade Status for China” (May 28, 1993),Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), book 1, 770–71.
12. Ibid., 770–72.
13. Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.”
14. Suettinger,Beyond Tiananmen, 168–71.
15. Warren Christopher,Chances of a Lifetime(New York: Scribner, 2001), 237.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 238.
18. Ibid., 238–39.
19. See, for example, Deng Xiaoping, “An Idea for the Peaceful Reunification of the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan: June 26, 1983,”Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, 40–42.
20. John W. Garver,Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 15; James Carman, “Lee Teng-Hui: A Man of the Country,”Cornell Magazine (June 1995), accessed at http://www.news.cornell .edu/campus/Lee/Cornell_Magazine_ Profile.html.
21. Lampton,Same Bed, Different Dreams, 101.
22. William J. Clinton, “Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters Following Discussions with President Jiang Zemin of China in Seattle: November 19, 1993,”Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 2022–25.
23. Garver,Face Off, 92–97; Robert Suettinger, “U.S. ‘Management’ of Three Taiwan Strait ‘Crises,’ ” in Michael D. Swaine and Zhang Tuosheng with Danielle F. S. Cohen, eds.,Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 278.
24. Madeleine Albright,Madam Secretary (New York: Hyperion, 2003), 546.
25. Robert Lawrence Kuhn,The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin(New York: Crown Publishers, 2004), 2.
26. Albright,Madam Secretary, 531.
27. Christopher Marsh,Unparalleled Reforms(New York: Lexington, 2005), 72.
28. Barry Naughton,The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007), 142–43.
29. Michael P. Riccards,The Presidency and the Middle Kingdom: China, the United States, and Executive Leadership(New York: Lexington Books, 2000), 12.
30. Lampton,Same Bed, Different Dreams, Appendix A, 379–80.
31. Zhu Rongji, “Speech and Q&A at the Advanced Seminar on China's Economic Development in the Twentyfirst Century” (September 22, 1997), inZhu Rongji's Answers to Journalists' Questions(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) (forthcoming), Chapter 5.
Chapter 18: The New Millennium
1. Richard Daniel Ewing, “Hu Jintao: The Making of a Chinese General Secretary,”China Quarterly 173(March 2003): 19.
2. Ibid., 21–22.
3.Xiaokang, now a widely used official policy term, is a 2,500-year-old Confucian phrase suggesting a moderately well-off population with a modest amount of disposable income. See “Confucius and the Party Line,”The Economist (May 22, 2003); “Confucius Makes a Comeback,”The Economist (May 17, 2007).
4. George W. Bush, “Remarks Following Discussions with Premier Wen Jiabao and an Exchange with Reporters: December 9, 2003,”Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 1701.
5. David Barboza, “Chinese Leader Fields Executives' Questions,”New York Times(September 22, 2010).
6. Cui Changfa and Xu Mingshan, eds.,Gaoceng Jiangtan[Top-leaders' Rostrums] (Beijing: Hongqi Chubanshe, 2007), 165–82, as cited in Masuda Masayuki, “China's Search for a New Foreign Policy Frontier: Concept and Practice of ‘Harmonious World,' ” 62, in Masafumi Iida, ed.,China's Shift: Global Strategy of the Rising Power(Tokyo: NIDS Joint Research Series, 2009).
7. Wen Jiabao, “A Number of Issues Regarding the Historic Tasks in the Initial Stage of Socialism and China's Foreign Policy,”Xinhua(February 26, 2007), as cited in Masuda, “China's Search for a New Foreign Policy Frontier: Concept and Practice of ‘Harmonious World,' ” 62–63.
8. David Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,”The Washington Quarterly34, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 8.
9. Zheng Bijian, “China's ‘Peaceful Rise' to Great-Power Status,”Foreign Affairs84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 22.
10. Hu Jintao, “Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity,” speech at the United Nations Summit (New York, September 15, 2005).
11. The number eight is regarded as auspicious in Chinese numerology. It is a near homonym for the word “to prosper” in some Chinese dialects.
12. Nathan Gardels, “Post-Olympic Powershift: The Return of the Middle Kingdom in a Post-American World,”New Perspectives Quarterly25, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 7–8.
13. “Di shi yi ci zhuwaishi jie huiyi zhao kai, Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao jianghua” [“Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao speak at the 11th meeting of overseas envoys”], website of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, accessed at http://www.gov.cn/ ldhd/2009-07/20/content_1370171.html.
14. Wang Xiaodong, “Gai you xifang zhengshi zhongguo ‘bu gaoxing’ le” [“It is now up to the West to face squarely that China is unhappy”], in Song Xiaojun, Wang Xiaodong, Huang Jisu, Song Qiang, and Liu Yang,Zhongguo bu gaoxing: da shidai, da mubiao ji women de neiyou waihuan[China Is Unhappy: The Great Era, the Grand Goal, and Our Internal Anxieties and External Challenges] (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2009), 39.
15. Song Xiaojun, “Meiguo bu shi zhilaohu, shi ‘lao huanggua shua lü qi'” [“America is not a paper tiger, it's an ‘old cucumber painted green' ”] in Song, Wang, et al.,Zhongguo bu gaoxing, 85.
16. A classical Chinese expression signifying a postconflict return to peace with no expectation of recommencing hostilities.
17. Song, “Meiguo bu shi zhilaohu,” 86.
18. Ibid., 92.
19. Ibid.
20. Liu Mingfu, Zhongguo meng: hou meiguo shidai de daguo siwei yu zhanlüe dingwei [China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era] (Beijing: Zhongguo Youyi Chuban Gongsi, 2010).
21. Ibid., 69–73, 103–17.
22. Ibid., 124.
23. Ibid., 256–62.
24. Some analyses posit that while the sentiments expressed in these books are real and may be common in much of the Chinese military establishment, they partly reflect a profit motive: provocative books sell well in any country, and nationalist tracts such asChina Is Unhappy and China Dreamare published by private publishing companies. See Phillip C. Saunders, “WillChina's DreamTurn into America's Nightmare?”China Brief 10, no. 7 (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, April 1, 2010): 10–11.
25. Dai Bingguo, “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development” (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, December 6, 2010).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Hu Jintao, “Speech at the Meeting Marking the 30th Anniversary of Reform and Opening Up” (December 18, 2008), accessed at http://www. bjreview.com.cn/Key_Document_ Translation/2009-04/27/content_194200. htm.
33. Dai, “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development.”
34. Ibid.
Epilogue: Does History Repeat Itself? The Crowe Memorandum
1. Crowe knew the issue from both sides. Born in Leipzig to a British diplomat father and a German mother, he had moved to England only at the age of seventeen. His wife was of German origin, and even as a loyal servant of the Crown, Crowe retained a cultural and familial connection to the European continent. Michael L. Dockrill and Brian J. C. McKercher,Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890–1951(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 27.
2. Eyre Crowe, “Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany” (Foreign Office, January 1, 1907), in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds.,British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. 3: The Testing of the Entente (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1928), 406.
3. Ibid., 417.
4. Ibid., 416.
5. Ibid., 417.
6. Ibid., 407.
7. Ibid.
8. Phillip C. Saunders, “Will China's Dream Turn into America's Nightmare?” China Brief 10, no. 7 (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, April 1, 2010): 10 ("ing Liu MingfuGlobal Timesarticle).
9. Liu Mingfu, Zhongguo meng: hou meiguo shidai de daguo siwei yu zhanlüe dingwei [China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-American Era] (Beijing: Zhongguo Youyi Chuban Gongsi, 2010), 24; Chris Buckley, “China PLA Officer Urges Challenging U.S. Dominance,” Reuters, February 28, 2010, accessed at http:// www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/01/ uschina- usa-military-exclusiveidUSTRE6200P620100301.
10. Richard Daniel Ewing, “Hu Jintao: The Making of a Chinese General Secretary,”China Quarterly173 (March 2003): 29–31.
11. Dai Bingguo, “Persisting with Taking the Path of Peaceful Development” (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, December 6, 2010).
12. Adele Hayutin, “China's Demographic Shifts: The Shape of Things to Come” (Stanford: Stanford Center on Longevity, October 24, 2008), 7.
13. Ethan Devine, “The Japan Syndrome,”Foreign Policy(September 30, 2010), accessed at http://www.foreignpolicy .com/articles/2010/09/30/the_japan_ syndrome.
14. Hayutin, “China's Demographic Shifts,” 3.
15. See Joshua Cooper Ramo, “Hu's Visit: Finding a Way Forward on U.S.-China Relations,”Time(April 8, 2010). Ramo adopts the concept of co-evolution from the field of biology as an interpretive framework for U.S.-China relations. 应对丛书·国际关系与格局（套装共8册）